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1. Introduction  
1.1 Basic concepts  
The main goal of this chapter is the economic valuation and prioritization of those 
investments which are intended to improve the power quality of the system. While most of 
the research work in the field of power quality was aroused by the scientific challenges to be 
overcome, it is fair to recognize that the practical importance of power quality hinges on the 
economic impact of such phenomena. 
Thus, economic analysis of power quality is of the outmost significance. Such analysis, 
according to present day corporate doctrine, implies the assessment of the changes in the 
market value which are produced when an ideal scenario – where electric energy is supplied 
without any imperfection – is disturbed by a series of distortional events, thus leading to a 
loss of quality. In brief, we want to relate imperfection level with market value. 
In a more practical line of thought, we wish to answer specific questions like this: how many 
equivalent dollars of market value are lost when the severity index of some type of 
imperfection increases – say – by one unit? Or – opposingly – how many dollars are won 
because of a decrease in severity? 
Moreover, given an intervention in the markets which diminishes the index, we seek to 
estimate the monetary benefit of such quality improvement. As we also know the capital 
needed to accomplish such intervention we can introduce in the market model and the 
change in value added may be subsequently calculated. Then, the relation between that 
change and the capital invested can be compared against a hurdle rate which functions as a 
yardstick for the merit of the intervention. This can be used also in order to prioritize capital 
investments on power quality (this rather straight way of investment prioritization, becomes 
more complicated when the uncertainties inlaid in the quality issues are introduced). 
1.2 The quality market model outline 
Figure 1 depicts the electricity market model without considerations on quality issues. 
Essentially, such market is based upon the capacity of the consumers to draw value from 
electrical energy through an usage system (the “EE usage” rectangle on upper right). This 
system is fed across a supply network (the rectangle below the first one). These two systems 
are the physical assets from which the creation of users value (S) results. The payment of 
users is the firm revenue (R). So the difference (U-R) can be seen as a surplus (S) obtained 
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from the acquisition of energy. Subtracted from (R) are the expenses need to operate the 
physical assets, taxes and the remuneration of capital (financial assets), the remaining value 
(V) goes to the investors, as seen at the left, (S) and (V) sum up to produce the public value 
(W) added to the society. Maximization of (W) is the ultimate goal of regulation mechanisms 
(Arango et al., 2008a). 
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Fig. 1. Diagram of the monetary streams (someones are virtuals) taking place in an 
electricity market. 
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Fig. 2. Insertion of Power Quality events in the Electricity Market Model. 
Figure 2 shows how the economic impact of quality events can be introduced in the 
previous market model. Due to the heterogeneous nature of such events they influence the 
customers, the firm or both. There is also an additional impact due to the capital invested in 
measures aimed to power quality improvement. Anyway, each of these influences can be 
duly taken on account and the net impact of quality on consumers’ surplus and the 
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companies’ economic value added can be calculated. (Those influences are located in Fig. 2 
as circles (1), (2) and (3)). 
In this way, this new market model allows a comprehensive treatment of power quality 
(P.Q.) either from the point of view of the utilities, customers or society. 
2. The consumers representation  
We shall begin with a brief explanation of the consumers attitude in regard to the electrical 
energy (E.E.). 
2.1 Basic assumptions 
a. From any quantity (E) of Electrical Energy the consumer gets a value of use expressed 
in monetary terms, as a concave value-function U(E), also known as a Von Neumann–
Morgenstern utility curve (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). The simplest function 
of such kind is a quadratic one, expressible as: 
 U(E) = a.E – ½ b.(E)2 (1) 
where (a) implies the Eagerness to use (E), while (b) portraits the Satiation due to the 
quantity already spent. 
b. The energy is sold at a fixed Tariff (T). Then, the purchase of a quantity (E) will demand 
a Payment P(E) given as: 
 P(E) = T.E (2) 
c. The difference between Value and Payment – whenever positive – represents a Surplus 
S(E) which the user draws from the transaction. Based on expressions for the equalities 
(1) and (2) results the following expression for the Surplus. 
 S(E) = (a-T)E – ½ b.(E)2 (3) 
2.2 The purchasing of energy 
Under the hypothesis above we postulate that the fundamental mechanism governing the 
purchase of E.E. can be verbalized as follows (Kreps, 1990; Jehle & Reny, 2000): 
“The consumer buys such quantities (E*) of energy that maximize his (her) surplus.” 
Then, (E*) must satisfy the well-known first-order condition: 
E=E*dS = ȋa - TȌ- bE* = ͲdE  
Thus, for any a>T, it results the optimal quantity purchased by the customer: 
 E* = (a-T)/b (4) 
This important equation relates consumption with price in the electricity market, in terms of 
the customer preference and the practiced tariff. The reverse equation is also very often 
useful: 
 T = a – bE (5) 
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From (2), (3) we shall have the optimized surplus: 
 S* = (b/2)E2 (6) 
and the corresponding payment: 
 P* = aE – bE2 (7) 
which is also the Revenue (R) of the firm. 
2.3 The diagram of economic flow of consumption 
The relationships above may be held together in a Diagram of Economic Flow as shown in 
Figure 3: 
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Fig. 3. Diagram of economic flow of a customer or cluster of customers. 
For a = 4300 US$/MWh, b = 500 US$/MWh2 and E = 8 TWh. The diagram is depicted in 
Figure 4: 
 
18400U =
16000S =
2400R =
 
Fig. 4. Diagram of economic flow with reasonable values for the monetary streams occurring 
in real world. 
Then, T = a – bE = 4300 – 4000 = 300 US$/MWh, as it should be. 
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2.4 Practical considerations 
The customers parameters (a,b) are not readily known in practice. Nevertheless, they can be 
related to information that is far more available. First, we are familiar with the purchased 
annual energy (E) and the firm revenue (R), thus we are also aware of T = R/E. Second, 
there is a basic economic parameter describing the consumers attitude with regard to the 
energy which was being thoroughly studied and measured: it is the Elasticity Consumption-
Price (┝), defined as: 
 ┝ = -(T/E)(dE/dT) (8) 
Recalling the fundamental equations (4) and (5) it can be devised a formula linking (┝) with 
(a) as: 
 a = (1+ ┝-1)T (9) 
On the other hand, we always have the formula (5) which is reiterated here. 
a – bE = T 
For example, let be E = 8 TWh, T = 300 US$/MWh, ┝ = 0,075=7,5% 
Then, from (9) we shall have: 
a = (1 + 1/0,075)300 = 4300 US$/MWh 
and using (5) it results: 
b = (a – T)/E = (4300 – 300)/8 = 500 US$/MWh2 
Note that: 
R = (4300 x 8) – (500 x 82) = 2400 MUS$ = 8 TWh x 300 US$/MWh 
as it should be. 
Observation: 
┝ varies with the point of operation of the customer. The value used in the calculus must be 
the elasticity computed for the same (T) obtained above. When ┝ was obtained for a different 
tariff T’, i.e., 
 ┝’ = - (T’/E)(dE/dt) = T’/bE = T’/(a – T’) (10) 
We must retrieve ┝ as: 
 a = (1+ ┝-1)T = (1+( ┝’)-1)T’ (11) 
Then: 
(1+ ┝-1) = (1+(1+ (┝’)-1)T/T 
which results in: 
┝’ = 1/((1-┝-1)(T/T’) – 1) 
Then 
 ┝ = 1/(1+(┝’)-1)(T’/T) – 1 (12) 
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For example, let be T’ = 150 US$/MWh. Then, we shall have: 
┝’ = 1/27,66666667 
or: 
┝’ = 0,036144578 
giving, as expected, 
┝ = 1/(28,66666667 x (150/300) -1) = 0,075 
For example, suppose the elasticity is known to be ┝’ = 0,036144578 for T’ = 150 US$/MWh. 
Then, we shall have ┝ = 0,075 for T = 300 US$/MWh. 
3. The firm representation 
3.1 A few words on capital and rates of return 
We start with a brief description of capital. Total capital (B) is composed by equity (A) – 
contributed by the Shareholders – and Debt (D) – due to the Bondholders. 
It is customary to define a Leverage Factor (├) such that (D = ├B) to express the level in 
which the firm is indebted. Moreover: 
1. An interest must be paid over debt at a convened debt-rate (rD). 
2. A remuneration should remain available over equity at an expected rate of return (rA). 
3. Interest is not subjected to taxation. Remuneration, instead, is fully taxable on a tax 
rate (t). 
4. rD and rA combine to produce the weighted-average cost of capital (WACC) where: 
 WACC = rw = (1-├)rA + ├(1-t)rD (13) 
where t is the tax rate. 
3.2 Financial statements 
We shall represent the firms by a statement of their performance over a given period or 
financial exercise.  
A statement begins always with the total Revenue (R), from which is deducted the Cost, 
thus leading to the so called Result. 
In order to make clear our choice of Statement, two types of such instruments are to be 
considered: 
1. Accounting statement 
Is the traditionally used and published (according to rules of USGAAP – United States 
Generally Accepted Accounting Practices), which Cost includes expenses and interest 
on debt (D). Its Result is called Net Profit (L). 
2. Economic value statement 
Cost includes not only expenses and interest, but the yield on the total capital (B). Its 
Result is called Economic Value Added (V) (Martin & Petty, 2000). 
In the following, we shall use the Economic Value Statement type, recognizing that it 
represents better the modern principles of corporate finance. Nevertheless, in order to 
highlight the distinctive features, some examples will be worked on both statements.  
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3.3 Modeling the firm 
The supplier is moulded as a system (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) whose input is the revenue 
(R). The various components of the economic cost (C) are then subtracted. As (C) includes 
de yield of all the capital (debt and equity) the remaining quantity (output or result) stands 
for the value (V) created above the expectations of investors. The firm surplus (V) is known 
as Economic Value Added or Economic Profit. 
One of the distinctive features of our representation is the proposal of a cost structure, that is 
to say, an explicit dependence among the various costs with the basic variables: supplied 
energy (E) and capital investment (B). 
The proposed structure, i.e. the supplier model, is presented as a diagram of economic flow 
in Figure 5. 
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R = Z+ V =TE
1- t
Y
Z =-
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t
(V + Y)
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t
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Fig. 5. Diagram of the Economic Value Statement of a distribution company (DISCO). 
where the symbols mean: 
R = Receipt; T = Tariff; C = Economic Cost; Z = Total Cost at Equilibrium; dB = Depreciation 
of Physical Assets; Y = rwB = Yield of Capital (equity plus debt); V= Economic Value Added 
or economic profit; EBIT = Earnings before interest and taxes 
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Note that the cost functions C(E, B) are depending also from certain parameters (e, p, d, w) 
portraying the operational and corporative efficiency of the firm on one hand and its 
technological standards on the other. 
Note that, a distinctive feature, our market model brings a cost structure, that is to say, a 
functional dependence among each component of cost and the fundamental variables, 
which are quantities of supply and capital investment. In our case the variables are the 
energy purchased (E) and the investments in scale (B) and quality (Q). 
As cost components we have the functions: 
eE - Operational expenses, energy bought from generation  companies and other charges. 
p(E2/B) - Cost of energy lost in the electric network. 
dB - Depreciation of physical assets. 
rwB - Reward  to investors 
3.4 The firm with optimal allotment of capital 
The investment B has an optimal value B* for which Z attains its minimal value Z*. B* is 
obtained by zeroing the derivative of Z(E, B) with respect to B: 
 
∂
∂
ʹʹZ pE= - + k = ͲB B  (13) 
Then 
 
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
ͳʹpB* = Ek  (14) 
and 
 
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
ͳʹZ* = e + ʹȋpkȌ E = cE  (15) 
Note that the average price remains constant. 
3.5 The firm in economic equilibrium 
Another condition of interest implies V=0. Then we shall have: 
 R = C = Z (16) 
In this case, the supplier firm is said to be in Economic Equilibrium. 
When the firm is simultaneously with optimal investment and an economic equilibrium we 
shall have: 
 R = C = Z = cE (17) 
where 
 c = e + 2(pk)½  (18) 
As will be explained later, a regulated firm should belong to this particular class. 
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4. Peculiarities of electricity markets 
4.1 The company as a natural monopoly 
It is important to note that the distribution company (DISCO) owns the electric network 
which allows the physical delivery of E.E. to the customers. Any other firm wishing to 
compete in the business should construct another network replicating the geographical 
layout of the original one. It is obvious that the entry of such competitor will decrease the 
overall market efficiency (Kupfer & Hasenclever, 2002). 
In such conditions, the disco has the market power required to impose whatever tariff which 
it has in mind. Clearly, the disco goal is to maximize its economic value added (V). Thus, it 
can be easily concluded that such tariff ought to satisfy: 
 
dR dZ
=
dE dE
 (19) 
Assuming that the company optimizes its investments, the equality (19) will lead to: 
 a – ZbE = c (20) 
Then, 
 EM = (a-c)/2b (21) 
and the “monopolistic” tariff will be: 
 TM = (a+c)/2 (22) 
Substituting (21) in the formula of (V), given in Figure 3, we shall have: 
 VM = (1-t)(R-Z)M = (1-t) ((a-c) – bEM) EM = (1-t)((a-c)2/4b) (23) 
4.2 The regulated firm 
It is widely accepted that monopolistic tariffs impose on the customers an unfair weight. 
Being the electricity supply a public service, it should be regulated in order to attain 
maximum generation of social welfare (Beesleyand & Littlechild, 1989). 
As social welfare is a debatable and elusive notion, regulators usually adopt, as a reasonable 
proxy, the quantity (Friedman, 2002): 
 W = S + V (24) 
i.e., the sum of the consumers’ surplus and the value created by the utility, (which was 
called Market Output). Nevertheless, the unconstrained maximization of W leads to 
nonsensical results implying the firm’s collapse. The constrained solution requires that the 
firm be operated in economic equilibrium. Then, for optimum investment, the regulated 
company is compelled to operate satisfying: 
 aE – bE2 = cE (25) 
Thus, leading to: 
 ER = (a-c)/b (26) 
www.intechopen.com
 Power Quality 
 
34 
and then 
TR = c 
4.3 Example of a regulated operation of a firm 
In order to enlighten the discussion on monopolist and regulated firms, Figure 6 shows the 
same distribution company supplying the same customers when operating free (i.e., using 
TM) and when regulated (TR). 
 
MONOPOLISTIC
U = 13040
S= 4000
R = 9040
800+120+48 = 968
8072
5327,52
0,099 X 480 = 47,52
VM = 5280 = (1-t)((a-c)2)/4b)
W = 9280
Optimized B M* = 480 M US$
REGULATED
U = 18080
16000
R = 2080
1600+240+96 = 1936
144
95,04
0,099 X 960 = 95,04
VR = 0
W = 16000
Optimized B R* = 960 M US$
(a) (b)
2744,48
Monopolistic
48,96
Regulated  
Fig. 6. Monopolistic and regulated diagram of economic flow of a given firm. 
Let be an utility and its costumers for the following parameters. 
Firm: 
e = 200 US$/MWh 
p = 3600 US$2/MWh2 
d = 0,10 
rw = 0,099 
c = 260 US$/MWh 
Customers: 
a = 4260 US$/MWh 
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b = 500 US$/MWh2 
Note: the parameters already given correspond to a stylized albeit of a real medium-size 
utility supplying a cluster of customers, typical of a developing country. 
In such case we shall have: 
Monopolistic 
TM = 2260 US$/MWh 
EM = 4 TWh 
Regulated 
TR = 260 US$/MWh 
ER = 8 TWh 
leading to the diagram of economic flow of Figure 6: 
4.4 The hurdle rate 
We shall assume that every distribution utility seeks to maximize its performance, expressed 
as the Result of its exercise Statement. But a question arises: what type of statement is to be 
adopted? 
As was said, there are two basic types, whose results are net profit and economic value 
added, respectively. 
On the other hand, consider a project applicable to the company. We want to know if this 
project is convenient.  
We shall define the hurdle rate (h) as the one for which the project does not change the 
Result produced by the company. 
The hurdle rate can be obtained for both types of statement according to the incremental 
analysis on Figure 7. 
 Ͳ
-ΔG + d.ΔB
hV = d + w/ȋͳ-tȌ
ΔG - dΔB
tȋΔG - dΔBȌ
ȋͳ-tȌȋΔG – d.ΔBȌ
wΔB
V = ȋͳ-tȌȋΔG – ȋd + ȋw/ȋͳ-tȌȌΔBȌ
Ͳ
hNP = d + Ɂ.rD
ΔG - dΔB
rD Ɂ ΔB
ΔG – ȋd + Ɂ.rDȌΔB
N = ȋͳ-tȌȋΔG – ȋd + Ɂ.rDȌΔBȌ
ȋaȌ ȋbȌ
-ΔG + d.ΔB
t.ȋΔG – ȋd + Ɂ.rDȌΔBȌ
 
Fig. 7.  Hurdle rate for economic value added and net-profit statements. 
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We can see that the hurdle rate depends heavily on the type of statement, that is to say, on 
the Result to be maximized. Substituting rw in Figure 7 (a) for its value in (13) we shall have: 
 A
V A D NP
1 - ├ (1 - ├)r
h = d + r +├r = h +
1 - t 1 - t
 (27) 
That is to say, the hurdle rate required to comply with economic value added is greater than 
the one for net profit by excess equal to: 
 Aͳ - Ɂ rͳ - t  (28) 
Example: 
Let be: d=0,05, rA=0,1595, rD=0,075  and ├=0,55. Then, rw=0,099 and: 
0,66
0,10875=
V NP
V NP A
Ͳ,Ͳͻͻh = Ͳ,Ͳ5 + = Ͳ,ʹͲ h = Ͳ,Ͳ5 + Ͳ,55xͲ,Ͳ͹5 = Ͳ,Ͳͻͳʹ5ͳ - Ɂh =h + Ͳ,ͳͲͺ͹5 = ɀͳ - t  
For the sake of comparison, Figure 8 depicts the accounting statements for the monopolistic 
and regulated operation of the same firm under the hypothesis of leverage factor ├ = 0,55,  
rA = 0,1595 and rD = 0,75. 
 
U = 13040
S = 4000
R = 9040
968
8072
2737,748
NM = 5314,452 = V+ γAA = 5280 
+ 0,1595.216
γDD = 0,075.264 = 19,8
8052,2
U = 18080
S = 16000
R = 2080
G = 1936
144
35,496
NV = 68,904 = V+ γAA = 0 + 
0,1595.432
γDD = 0,075.528 = 39,6
104,4
hNP = 0,10 + 0,55.0,075 = 0,14125
B* = 480
A* = 216
D* = 264
B* = 960
A* = 432
D* = 528
  
 
Fig. 8. Net profit statements for the data. 
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Note that L - V is always equal to the equity yield rA.A as appears at the bottom of both 
diagrams of economic flows. 
4.5 The electricity Market Model (M.M.) 
The (M.M.) is obtained by simply joining the two representations already made, as shown in 
simplified form in Figure 9. 
 
U
S
R
V
C = Z + (t/(1-t))V
W
 
Fig. 9. The basic Electricity Market Model. 
Now the total diagram can be interpreted as a single system whose input is the value of use 
of the electric energy and whose output is the sum of the consumers’ surplus and the 
company economic value added. 
5. The Insertion of quality in the electricity Market Model 
5.1 Basic considerations 
The approach to power quality is built on the notion of quality event, that is to say, any 
occurrence leading to some imperfection of the product (electric energy) or service (electric 
supply). Quality events are of the most different nature and consequences. In order to assess 
their effects, (especially for regulatory purposes) each type of event is associated to some 
numeric index of severity. 
As an example, take the important class of events which cause interruptions on the electrical 
supply. This type of imperfections is customarily described by the average (or expected) 
time during which customers are de-energized (DTD) and the average frequency of 
interruption (DFD). These are technical indexes which affect both consumers and suppliers. 
The functional dependence between such indexes and their economic impacts may be 
highly complex and heterogeneous. Thus, in order to get a unified and simple picture we 
shall assume that quality can be introduced as an additional cost (CQ) (Arango et al., 2008b, 
Arango et al., 2010), which must be paid by consumers and producers in various 
proportions. 
5.2 The quality cost 
We shall call (CQ) quality cost. The structure of (CQ) will be assumed as: 
 CQ = qE2/Q (29) 
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In this formula Q represents the capital investment which is devoted mainly to enhance 
power quality. Please note that Q adds to the capital (B) already considered, which is chiefly 
invested on the network size. In this line, Q and B shall be usually referred as “quality” and 
“scale” investment, respectively. 
Of course, more realistic assumptions for the economical impact of quality may be done, but 
the approach above allows obtaining analytic answers leading to a better and faster 
understanding of such impact. Otherwise, such analysis gives satisfactory results in a broad 
class of practical problems regarding power quality. 
The electricity market model including quality issues is depicted in Figure 10. 
 
U = aE – (b/2)E
2
(b/2)E
2
= S
CQ
R
C
eE + (pE
2
/B) + d(B+Q)
TAXES
w(B+Q)
V
 
Fig. 10. The electricity market model considering Power Quality. 
5.3 The purchasing of polluted energy 
The consumption of imperfect energy is governed by the same principle of surplus 
maximization introduced in section for perfect energy. In the present case we shall have: 
 S = U – R – CQ = (a-T)E – (b/2 + q/Q)E2 (30) 
Then 
 
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠E=E*dS ʹq= a - T - b + E = ͲdE Q  (31) 
Thus 
 
a - TE* = ʹqb + Q  (32) 
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and 
 S* = ½(b + 2q/Q)E2 (33) 
5.4 Optimizing the investment on quality 
Note that investment on quality Q can be optimized in the same way that the investment on 
network scale B. Then, we shall have: 
 
1
2
E
k
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
qQ* =  (34) 
and 
 ( )1* 2QC qk E=  (35) 
leading to an optimized cost 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 12 2 2pk qk c qk+ = +#c = e +  (36) 
where c comes from (18). 
5.5 The regulation of Power Quality 
Power quality regulation adjusts to the following rationale: 
The basic regulated variable is price (i.e., the electricity tariff). Moreover, recall that the main 
goal of regulation is the maximization of social welfare which is attained when the supplier 
company operates at equilibrium, that is to say, with zero economic profit. Additionally, the 
agency requires that the company have “efficient costs and prudent investments”. Such 
criteria are met trough a benchmark procedure, searching for the parameters that should be 
adequate for a virtual or reference company adapted to the real conditions of supply (such 
as area to be served, number of customers, network technology, etc.) while investment of 
capital in quality must be optimal in the sense discussed in 4.3. 
In such conditions, the agency obtains the average tariff by dividing the economic cost by 
the energy to be sold. 
The crucial point of this process is the calculus of the quality cost. Observe that the 
parameter q comes from the reference company and Q* is the optimized capital. We assume 
that the corresponding quality cost CQ is univocally related to the severity index. The index 
value which corresponds to the (CQ*) of the reference company is obtained as the practical 
target to be pursued by the regulated firm. In other words, the agency includes in the total 
cost allowed to the company the CQ* associated with the target index, expecting that the 
customers receive exactly such level of quality. 
If a particular customer is committed to a lesser quality level, the agency will require that 
the firm pay to him (her) a monetary compensation (usually as a discount in the next 
electricity bill) equal to the difference between the actual and the target cost of quality. This 
implies an effective tariff for which the consumer pays only for the quality level that he or 
she is actually receiving. The process described above is presented in Figure 11. 
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The company parameters in the case outlined are: 
e = 200 US$/MWh  p = 3600 US$2/MWh2  q = 1600 US$2/MWh2  d = 0,10   w = 0,099 
Assuming E = 8 TWh the customer parameters come to be: 
a= 4320 US$/MWh  b = 500 US$/MWh2 
and the optimal investments result in 
B* = 960 MUS$    Q* = 640 MUS$ 
This leads to the flow diagram of Figure 11. In this example the investment in quality is one 
half of the optimum level.  
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Fig. 11. Diagram of economic flows of the company when under-invested, with 
compensation. 
Then, the cost CQ is two times of the optimized cost CQ* = MUS$160.  
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But the company is required to return to the customer the difference MUS$320 - MUS$160 = 
MUS$160 as a consequence, the consumer pays as effective tariff equal to 260 US$/MWh, 
which corresponds to the degradated energy which he (she) receives. 
Note that the company in such conditions has a negative V. Thus, compensation also acts as 
a disincentive for underinvestment and a stimulus for optimal use of capital. 
6. Conclusions 
Along the chapter we have laid the foundations of an Electricity Market Model, named 
TAROT – Tariff Optimization, which: 
a.  allows for the consumers representation, featuring the surplus that they draw for the 
purchasing of energy; 
b. considers the basic goal of the regulatory frame, namely the maximization of the social 
value generated by the market transactions; 
c. favors the insertion of the quality levels of supply expressed as quality costs and quality 
improvements as capital investment; 
d. unifies the regulatory frame – initially restricted to a cap-price of the energy 
disregarding its imperfections – optimizing both the scale and the quality portions of 
total invested capital. 
Other applications can be devised on the same lines of thought. Perhaps the main advantage 
of this approach lies in this integrative potential which allows treating problems of very 
diverse nature and characteristics under a unified insight. 
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